A Postmodern Turkey?

Published by Today's Zaman, 9 December 2011 



For at least eight years now, Turkey has been likened to either countries with strong inclinations to theopolitics like Iran, or authoritarian ones, like Russia. While the never-ending longing to find a teleological destination for Turkey keeps producing new panic attacks, few analysts have been paying attention to the very “Western” trends that have been changing Turkish society and politics for the past 15 years.

The change began with the reforms under Turgut Özal, but lost political momentum until the creation of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Yet, the effects of increasingly open markets, integration into international structures and flourishing independent media on the depoliticized post-1980 generations continued as an undercurrent. Political apathy, mistrust in and frustration with the political elite and their power games showed itself strongly in the 2002 elections. The Turkish public was demanding a new type of politics and society.

The strong vision of a homogenized nation-state began to weaken its hold. Appetite for military involvement in politics declined sharply. The cultural and economic elite of the three leading cities increasingly lost their hegemony. Religious beliefs and personal quests for meaning became trendy, but in potluck fashion, depending on the desired worldview and needs of the individual. Questions on previously clear-cut identity definitions, such as Turkishness, became points of debate. Cracks in carefully constructed national myths and histories began to appear. Melancholy and a romantic view of the good old days of the “founding fathers” descended like fog. Political activism turned to limited and shallow articulations of sensitivity expressed via changing Facebook profile pictures and leaving “bold” comments on newspaper websites.

Turkish architecture, too, started changing. Housing blocks broke with well-established traditional construction, and design and style were increasingly put first. Advertisers began selling “lifestyles” in “exclusive” compounds. Construction firms are now competing to build eco-friendly buildings. “Holistic” food products, yoga lessons and mild forms of East Asian philosophies are popular.

The days of valuing house decorations or cultural products to the level they are not Turkish are over. Contemporary designs that blend Anatolian colors and styles, as well as TV soap operas that place a rural way of life into contemporary İstanbul settings are meeting the deepening need for “authenticity” for alienated and rootless urban Turks. Thus, Turkish rock, rap and high-brow artists are using previously shunned Turkish beats and learning to cherish the rich heritage of the country. Rather than all-inclusive hotels dominated by hungry tourists, an increasing number of boutique hotels in hidden corners of the country provide ample satisfaction of the authentic experience and the pleasure of finding something not consumed by the mass market.

The careful reader, especially from North America and Europe, will smile upon hearing all this, as this description of Turkey may sound just like “home.” All of these are indeed signs of postmodernity. Postmodernity is a sociopolitical and cultural reality, not to be confused with postmodernism as a philosophical school of thought with a strong anti-realist tone. Derrida or Foucault or even consumption of an Andy Warhol print art are of no value in decoding footprints of postmodernity in today’s Turkey.

In line with the nature of postmodernity, unlike modernism and modernity, which were brought to Turkey through a small European educated or influenced elite and enforced top to bottom, postmodernity is an incoherent grassroots affair. This is alien to the current gatekeepers of Turkish intelligentsia and their comrade publishers, all of whom share the ever so melancholic memories of the days when the words “left” and “right” mattered, and where citing Marx was a sign of intellectual sophistication.

While one does see clinical cases of time capsules frozen in the 1970s in Turkey’s intellectual landscape, an increasing number are becoming today’s liberals with modified paradigms though strongly shaped by memories of the past. Slowly, we are seeing emerging cosmopolitan intellectuals, who can be committed Muslims or staunch atheists or Kurds or Armenians, who are talking of a plural Turkey that cherishes diversity and where equal citizenship based on individual rights is the main vision, not some macro-political narrative.

Political parties that did not realize these deep changes all died out one by one as the AK Party won one victory over another. In fact, even the strongest citadel of modernity, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), has had to come to terms with the new Turkey, albeit slowly and painfully. No surprise then, a leading general who delivered a key speech at the height of the AK Party versus the military match declared “postmodernists,” who did not see a strict nation-state vision as a precursor for being a nation, as a new national threat.

The AK Party saw and seized the changes by providing everything that postmodernity demanded: economic growth to sustain and increase consumerism, pragmatism with a moral language but beyond zero-sum idealism, affirmations of cultural authenticity along side allowing multiple identities, accountability and quality service from state structures, and most importantly a sense that we are a “cool” country.

Just as Turkey managed to formulate a unique blend of modernist ideas and appropriated them to suit itself, such as laïcité, Turkey is now adjusting into its own forms of postmodernity. Some of these developments are vital for Turkey to survive in the 21st century. Yet, experiences of Europe and North America show that postmodernity also has a deep dark side.


The world according to Bashar al-Assad





Published by Today's Zaman, 25 November 2011


Over the last few weeks, I was able to listen to a number of people who recently visited Syria and met and talked with Bashar al-Assad himself.

With such fresh personal insights into what’s inside his mind and what we have seen from his public statements of late, we are able to put together a picture of how he sees what’s happening around him.
It is clear that Assad is still confident of his stand and does not see an end to his regime. Firstly, he thinks that the White House is fooling American citizens by making public declarations of freezing his and his family’s assets in the US, but not actually pressuring Syria. Assad points out that he has no assets whatsoever in the US and President Barack Obama knows that too. He sees a US unwilling to unsettle his rule and dependent on other countries, such as Turkey. Secondly, he thinks that Israel wants him in office and that they will never back any strong campaign against him, let alone one that could lead to a crumbling Syria ruled by Islamists.

Thirdly, Assad thinks that Turkey’s pressure on him is limited and that the strong reactions shown by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government are only for the public. He does not think there is anything else Turkey can do from now on. He believes that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) still hold the main power in the country and will never allow “Islamists” to take Turkey to war. Given that Syrian and Turkish rapprochement began with military relations, Assad still holds positive feelings towards the TSK. He believes that he has enough to work on with Kurds to create indirect pressure on Turkey.

Fourthly, Assad continues to hold deep mistrust towards powerful Arab countries in the region. He sees Egypt as not being a true Middle Eastern country, but a North African one. Egypt, for him, only makes noise but has no actual power or influence in the region. He sees the Gulf countries as villains. He believes that all of the booming countries, such as the UAE, Qatar and even Saudi Arabia, are doomed to collapse and fail when the petrol money runs out as they are not “real” nations. He sees Saudi Arabia as a major threat with its never ending funding of radical groups. He believes Qatar to be too ambitious but lacking any substance. Jordan, accordingly, is a small puppet kingdom for the US.

US, EU and Arab countries untrustworthy

The fall out between the majority of Arab countries and Syria during the Iraq-Iran war, and the Syrian-Iranian relations that drew closer in that process, continue to shape Assad’s thinking. He knows that the US, EU and Arab countries want him to draw closer to their bloc, and away from Iran, but finds the proposed partners untrustworthy. His lifelines, Iran and influence over Lebanon, seem to be strong and entrenched. Thus, threats from the Arab League do not faze him.

Beyond what we see in the international media and our emotive anticipations over another Arab Spring revolution, Assad still has important levels of domestic support. The fears of radical Sunni groups not only dominating the country, but enforcing Islam on the masses, is common even among conservative Sunni Muslims, not least among the Alewites and liberals. The substantial Christian community in the country is sleepless with fear of a possible post-Assad Syria. He now publicly acknowledges that mistakes were made towards Kurds. He seems set to ensure that Kurds who were previously denied citizenship are now granted it and that they come to see themselves as Syrians.

His underlying political discourse still speaks of some sort of Pan-Arab idealism, not Syrian nationalism. He speaks of Arab unity and power, and yet what he means by that remains elusive. Just like his father, he tries to evoke Arab nationalism across the Arab world and fails to achieve it. He is acutely aware that his Arab unity discourse is pretty much limited to Lebanon and Syria and he is actually talking about Syrian influence and power, led by his family. However, his primary concern and warnings that Syria will be overtaken by Islamists echo a significant portion of his countrymen and fellow Arabs in other countries as well as worried eyes in Europe and North America. He still has a winning argument built on these fears to legitimize his brutal crackdown on “rebels.”

Assad is not wrong in some of his readings of his neighborhood. He is masterfully aware of the fears of the majority of Syrians, most of who want the turbulent days to end so that they can go back to their normal lives and feel safe again. The “uprising” in Syria does not seem to have reached the critical mass needed to topple the Assad regime, and the armed forces and intelligence services remain faithful and in tact. Regional dynamics still maintain support for Syria, as well as the animosities that Syria has learned to live with and navigate through for the last 20 years. The chaotic Syrian opposition is not in a place to challenge and replace him in the near future. In fact, some of their protests and signs of militant attacks are not welcomed widely. In other words, there is no immediate major change on the horizon, at least not yet.

The true test of democracy in the Middle East

Published by Today's Zaman, 1 November 2011

As the sociopolitical changes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continue to dazzle and excite, analysts are trying to decode what the word “democracy” means for the new actors in the region and how the democratization process may or may not unfold.

Unlike popular perceptions, the measure of things to come is not whether fair and free elections are held, but whether or not religious freedom will be upheld.

A Western ambassador once told me with great excitement that Saudi Arabia was undertaking slow but major reforms to improve its legal system. There were improvements in all human rights concerns. When I asked him about religious freedom issues, he said that would never change. He spoke of how he had urged a leading prince to allow a church to open in the country. The prince replied, “Just as there are no mosques in the Vatican, there can never be a church in Saudi Arabia, the holy land of Islam.”
The states in the region see regulation of religion as an important aspect of forming national narratives and maintaining power. Thus, even Muslims who do not fit into the officially endorsed versions of Islam are denied their rights to live freely according to their own beliefs. Non-Muslims from traditional ethnic communities are often allowed to dwell in their ghettos, granted they do not demand equal rights or opportunities.

Even that limited understanding of tolerance disappears when Muslims leave Islam for another religion. While the United Arab Emirates publishes yearly a proud official list of people converting to Islam and the al-Azhar University in Egypt ensures that new converts to Islam change their ID cards and civil registration within 24 hours, the reverse is not possible. Those who leave Islam face life-threatening conditions, both from their governments and their own communities.

When I conducted field research across the region for the writing of the report “No Place to Call Home: Experiences of Apostates from Islam and Failures of the International Community,” I saw with my own eyes the brutal reality of how even the most liberal Muslim voices can react to news of a Muslim leaving Islam. Ironically, the same voices would urge me to continue promoting religious freedom so that they can be free to live as they want to without ever realizing that either all human beings have a right to freedom of religion, belief, conscience and thought, or none of us do.

 Will things change as the democracy fever spreads across the region? Sadly, I do not think so. The democratic transition pretty much meant the end of Christianity in Iraq. Christian communities were forced out of their historical dwellings by Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds alike. Since they had no militias and were seen as American proxies, they were easy prey for terrorist groups. The Iraq experience proved that fair and free elections and elected governments do not mean that every human being will be treated equally, protected and given a voice over the future of their country.

While discourses on democracy and human rights float lavishly in MENA today, the brutal handling of Coptic protests in Cairo by the Egyptian army and numerous attacks on Coptic Christians and Sufi Muslims in Egypt since January point to serious discrepancies. Even among “liberal” and democracy-promoting, conservative circles and media, the victims were declared the inciters, and rather than addressing the problems, the blame was once again laid on “foreign powers.”

The fact is Christianity is slowly but clearly disappearing across MENA. With the exception of Lebanon, even sizable Christian communities -- such as the 10-million strong Copts of Egypt -- live as excluded, second-class citizens. Most Muslims, Europeans and Americans seem shocked to hear that Christianity is actually a Middle Eastern religion and belongs to these lands.

The same fate awaits other communities, too. With the exception of Turkey, the chances of meeting a Jew anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa are as slim as meeting a famous rock star. Followers of Bahaism, which originated in Iran, suffer serious abuse and are denied almost every socioeconomic right across the region. Yet, no emerging Arab democrats -- even the most liberal ones -- talk about the fate of the millions of marginalized people among them. For now, democracy in MENA seems to be in its most naked and simple form: the rule of the majority for the majority’s interests.

So, if you want to take measure of how close MENA is getting to the ideals of democracy and human rights, look at where religious freedom in its countries is heading. Simply put, the extent to which a country grants religious freedom is the extent to which all other rights will be protected and democracy will mature and be sincere.
 

Demystifying social media and the "Arab Spring"

Published by the Commentator, 23 October 2011

Now that the dust is settling and the shape of things to come (or not to come) is becoming clear, we can all leave aside our amplified excitement over the role played by social media in revolutions we have witnessed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) this year.

While I do remain an avid user of tools such Twitter as well as keeping my own blog, the attention that social media has got in the mainstream media since January 2011 is not backed by reality in the field and at times, far from being helpful, it brought along additional problems.

Firstly, the limited nature of communication through social media meant that complex events and developments were reduced down to misleading sound bites.

Take the phrase "Arab Spring" for example. At its face value, it seems to capture what has been happening in MENA and still leaves 129 characters to play with in the 140 character economy. Yet nothing can be more misleading and problematic than that phrase.

The changes in the region are not simply about Arabs, but include Turks, Iranians and a host of other ethnic groups and countries.

In addition, the language of 'spring' assumes a linear process from worse to better. But we know that socio-political changes are not linear, and after spring might come winter.

However, the most troubling part of the phrase is it's ethnocentrism, that communicates a patronizing message that the Arabs are finally waking up and demanding freedoms like us; as if they have been sleeping all these years.

Secondly, the place of internet based social media is a lot smaller in MENA than it’s made out to be.

Various sources, such as the World Bank or Internet World Stats, provide us with credible data on the use of internet in a given country. Internet penetration rates remain at an average of thirty percent across the region.

In the UAE it is thought to be more than sixty-five percent but in Syria it is thought to be around nineteen percent and in Yemen, as little as nine percent.

In Egypt, internet use was around twenty percent by the time of impeachment of Mubarak, showing a leap after January with some 7 million new users.

An internet business advisor in Cairo told me that in January, Twitter had only an estimated 300 thousand users in the country. He also pointed out that the most widely spread tweets were in English, thus limiting the access to a small number of Egyptians.

The humble foot print of social media is also visible in the fact that the internet savvy and relatively affluent youth were only one of the cohorts making up millions of Egyptians from every walk of life who stood up for their country.

They were more visible than the trash collecting Zebeleen or the victims of state violence or indeed members of religious movements and the hungry, unemployed, urban poor, because with their handle on media, language skills and appeal, they were able to attract a disproportionate amount of media coverage.

Thirdly, the use of internet in the region is still minuscule compared to the two main communication tools people use to gather information and mobilize: satellite TV and mobile phones.

In Libya, while internet penetration is around seven percent, back in 2008, it became the first African country to reach 100 percent mobile phone penetration. Even those who tweeted from Tahrir square and those who were trying to organize marches and protests in Syria, Iran, Bahrain and Libya were using mobile phones to do so.

Since literacy rates remain low and language barriers limit on-line information sources, and since almost every house in MENA has satellite dishes which, unlike internet satellite signals, are practically impossible to block completely nationwide, people were watching channels like Al Jazeera for their news.

Television remains the number one source of information and media for this region.

Fourthly, social media also caused serious damage too.

False reports spread like wildfire. It became impossible to confirm stories and facts behind poor quality clips on YouTube.

This also gave a great platform for state security services to manipulate social media, spread rumours that snipers were firing on people and that demonstrations were not happening.

Unconfirmed information or sinister misinformation made reporting developments much more challenging. Governments were also able to map out who was behind what and who was related to whom with a few clicks.

And lastly, social media mania, cherished by the marketing gurus of certain websites and hailed as the future of social change by Western commentators, blinded us to the main factor that makes revolutions happen: human beings who risk everything.

It is the human being that utilizes various communicative tools, written, spoken or visual, to reach out to others.

It is human physical presence that protests, demands change and ousts governments.

A click on a mouse or keypad, no matter what it means for the advertisement providers and for eager owners of frequently visited websites, does not mean a thing in itself.

For these reasons, while we can't deny that social media did contribute a pinch of salt to the grand dish brought together by a host of factors, ultimately all praise is due to the brave people of MENA, the vast majority of who have no idea of who Mark Zuckerberg is.

Religion and diplomacy in the 21st century: the Turkish model

























Published by Today's Zaman, 17 October 2011

When newspapers briefly mentioned that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu joined in prayer at a mosque in Bosnia during a state visit, I was surprised that the story was not debated in the Turkish press.

This shows how far Turkey has come toward feeling at home in its own skin. There was a time when Muslim Turkish women wearing headscarves were not admitted to events at Turkish embassies. But more than domestic debates on religion and secularism, what we are seeing in Turkey now is a fast-emerging model for the practice of diplomacy in the 21st century.

A strong unwritten code, mostly the residue of 19th and early 20th century classical ideas of diplomatic service, still guides practices in foreign ministries around the world. One of the biggest taboos on the list is the topic of religion. The conventional wisdom not only forbids talking about religion with colleagues or peers in other countries, but also forces diplomats and politicians to hide their own religious beliefs. Religion is seen as a topic outside of the craft of diplomacy, save for the occasional handshake with an important but liberal religious figure. When Tony Blair’s personal faith became a public discussion in the UK, his spin doctor famously declared, “We don’t do God!”

Since the 1970s, however, this conventional diplomatic wisdom has been suffocating foreign policy practice and hindering countries from engaging with one of the most important factors in today’s world. Since international relations theorists and practitioners are some 20 years behind sociologists and political scientists in grasping the place of religion in the world today, the world’s high-flying diplomatic elite remain ignorant and detached from the topic. This was what Madeline Albright lamented in her book “The Mighty and the Almighty.” Ms. Albright pointed out that she had countless advisors on every possible issue, but none on religion. While 9/11 and the war on terror created an exploitative market of religion and terror experts, for most governments conversations on religion do not go beyond counterinsurgency policies.


Recently, the White House has initiated efforts to bring religion experts within the giant US foreign policy machinery together in various working groups, to understand how religion affects global affairs. The Norwegian and Dutch foreign ministries also increasingly sought to get their head around religion and are engaging with religious figures. Canada is considering creating an ambassador-at-large on religious freedom issues, just like the US. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has only one staff member in its human rights team whose portfolio includes religion as well as a few other “minor” concerns. That’s probably more than the French foreign ministry, as the domestic context in France and its obsession with “cults” results in an utter ignorance of religious issues.

In all of these cases, engagement with religion is only at the early stage of recognizing the truth of religion’s role in today’s world. But diplomats in the field continue to be deaf and mute, blinded and handicapped by the old conventional wisdom. There is a worrying belief among American diplomats that the US Constitution bans them from engaging with religion. On the other hand, for some other countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, officially sponsored missionary work and the manipulation of key religious figures are seen as important assets in their toolkit for advancing their national interests.

Silently, Turkey has taken the conversation to the next level; it neither shuns the topic nor promotes a particular brand of religion in pursuing its geopolitical ambitions. It plays diplomacy in extremely secular and pragmatic ways, yet, at the same time sees no problem in expressing religious belief, using religious language and appealing to religious values when it needs to.

The Turkish prime minister’s visit to a key Shiite shrine in Iraq to promote Sunni-Shiite relations might have been dismissed by Western diplomatic circles as a populist and non-diplomatic gesture. However, for those of us who have been raising the alarm about the increasing pressure at the Shiite and Sunni fault lines, this was in fact a diplomatic act for the future of the region. Unlike all other models of religious engagement in the 21st century, Turkey is managing to use its religious capital not only with fellow Muslims but also with non-Muslims and the wider world. While their European and American counterparts find it naive, many of us have welcomed Turkish and Spanish efforts to create an Alliance of Civilizations.

This silent paradigm shift is no coincidence. The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) foreign policy makers are schooled not only in classical Western concepts but also in Islamic thought and deeply appreciate the complexities and power of religious beliefs. It seems the “Turkish model” is useful not only for helping Muslim-majority states think about balancing conservatism and democracy. It can also help Western diplomats think about how they can update their diplomatic framework.

Making sense of false media reports on Turkey

Published by Today's Zaman, 6 October 2011

I have never been interested in conspiracy theories or respected those who promote them.

So perhaps this article is the beginning of my own decline, but increasingly I am observing an interesting pattern of implausible news reports about Turkey emerging in the world media at critical junctures.

The first odd report that caught my attention was in a British newspaper, the Telegraph, which claimed that Iran had given $25 million to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) for its election campaign. While the Telegraph did not cite any sources, other than a “Western diplomat,” rumors among UK foreign policy circles pointed to Israeli sources. The amount that was said to have been given by Iran was peanuts compared to the riches of the business constituency backing the AKP, which was set to win the elections with or without Iran’s financial support. The claim was also made at a time when the Kemalist state elite were looking under every rock for pretexts to shut down the AKP, but none of these groups took this golden opportunity to bash the AKP. Eventually, the Telegraph issued an apology for the false report.

The second dubious case involves reports citing Pakistani intelligence sources as saying that a Turkish F16 pilot had joined al-Qaeda. Pakistan denied that it had ever discovered such a thing. The symbolism of the news was powerful, as it seemed to indicate that the army -- once the stronghold of secularism in Turkey -- and its most elite units were now becoming Islamists. Ironically, the same staunch secularism ensured that no Islamist or even a devout Muslim could ever have made it that far in the Turkish military. To this day, the number of Turks known to be involved in international terrorism is minuscule compared to the number of British, American, Pakistani, Somali and Saudi citizens known to be.


The third one was just last week. According to reports, the Turkish state tried to make a secret pact with Syria and pledged Turkish support to end the rebellion in the country if President Assad ensured that a quarter of ministerial posts would be given to members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Supposedly, Bashar al Assad’s refusal of the deal led to the recent “dramatic worsening” in relations between the two countries.

The same week, there was also news in the Cypriot press that Israeli jets threatened a Turkish vessel searching for natural gas sources in the Mediterranean. Both Israel and Turkey denied that such a skirmish happened. Given the precarious nature of relations between the two countries lately, if such a thing were to happen, Turkey would be sending its entire navy.

In all of these news reports, we see a subtext which attempts to show Turkey as an Islamist country that supports terrorism and has close links with rogue regimes, with a dangerous and sinister agenda to attack Israel and undermine the West. Leaving aside the epistemological problems in justifying the validity of such claims, the main question is who would want to promote such an image, and why? These reports almost always pop up at moments when Turkey is making unusual foreign policy decisions, or finds itself at odds with the interests of particular countries. Sometimes they are the products of sloppy journalism and commentators who see the world through their own ideological lenses.

The other possibility, equally plausible, is that an official spin doctor or a think tank pundit is trying to frame a particular image of Turkey for Western policy makers and public opinion. Misinformation, propaganda and setting the tone and language of the news are common tools used by governments and intelligence services. Some of these reports originate from various anti-AKP circles in Turkey, while some come from anti-Turkish circles in the US and EU and the Middle East. Even Syria tried to disseminate news that Syrians seeking asylum in Turkey had been raped and tortured. The desired outcome, no matter who is pursuing it, is to limit Turkey’s growing influence, undermine its foreign policy initiatives and imprison Turkey in the camp of “evil” countries, which need to be punished, isolated and not granted what they seek.

The bad news is that the average reader, who is exposed only to a small portion of unfolding events in the world, remains vulnerable to being easily manipulated by such news. The good news, however, is that the complexity of the international media, with its multiplicity of sources and technologies, makes such attempts fragile and weak. Ultimately, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn said, one word of truth shall outweigh the whole world.

Hudson Institute Talk: Defection from Islam

Hudson Talk: Defection from Islam from John on Vimeo.

Ziya Meral provides an overview of treatment of apostates in Muslim-majority states and communities today and explains why the issue of conversion from Islam is one of the most contentious issues in the Islamic world today. He presents the socio-political and cultural factors that lead to persecution. He notes that the issue of apostasy is often debated in abstract, especially in debates on Islam and democracy, but he says it is first and foremost an over looked human rights abuse committed by states.

Reflections from Tahrir square tonight























Unpublished Blog notes

I am currently in Cairo. Over the years, I have come to love this country and it's people with all of it's complexities. And the experiences of tonight brings home all the good and the bad.

When I heard the news that Copts were protesting by the television studio near Tahrir square, I thought about how much things have changed here. Copts protesting was unheard till very recently. The church leaders have always refused it, mostly out of fear and Copts never thought their exclusion will end anyway.

As I walked towards the area, it became clear that the protests have turned violent. Smoke was everywhere, and people were running and shouting. Then came the military in their riot gears, firing rounds and tear gas. Soon, I had my own share of the gas and joined running crowds.

Muslims were marching with Christians, defending rights and protection for all Egyptians. A Muslim told me that he is here to defend Christians. Then picked up empty shells on the road and showed them to me.

Protesters grouped by Tahrir square, and the military police sent more troops. More rounds.. More tear gas.. Then, a water cannon truck got stopped by crowds and torn down.

A young girl ran to me and asked me if I was a foreigner, I said I am. In perfect English, she asked me to run and go to any hotel I can enter. She said its not safe. And when I asked "what about you?", she said "this is my country. I will be here." Her genuine concern for me but disregard for her own life moved me deeply.

Eventually, I walked away from the area as my eyes burnt and I kept coughing.

Tonight, I saw first hand what I have been writing about and researching in Egypt for years now. Coptic youth are even coming against the Church's demands for calm and are now demanding a life equal with their Muslim compatriots. Since the impeachment of Mubarak, their situation only got worse. You can watch a TV debate I partook on the topic here!

But tonight, I was also reminded that the deep human longing for freedom and dignity are universal and inherent to all of us, whether Muslims or Christians or atheists. When it is denied, people will eventually raise their voices.

Now, the Egyptian media is playing a dangerous game and some army officials are asking Egyptians to defend their army. The reports make it look like only soldiers got killed and wounded, so as to signal the blame on protesters for escalation of the problem. It just goes to show, the Revolution is not done yet, but it is in the making.