Israel: The model for the future of Egypt?






Published online by Channel 4 News, 03 February 2011

While President Mubarak and his faithful inner circle are pulling all of their usual tricks to maintain power, the international community is busy conceiving scenarios for the future of Egypt.

For some, the future looks bleak. Doomsday projections include an immediate Islamist takeover of the country which would result in Islamisation of the seemingly secular country structures, end of neutral relations with Israel, cooperation with the "war on terror" and issues regarding Palestine, stability in economic relations, and access to key transportation routes. The archetype, which the process in Egypt is likened to in these scenarios, is Iran.

For others, the future looks bright. The word "revolution" evokes strong feelings of excitement and exhilaration. The long-awaited era of democracy, human rights, and socio-economic flourishing is seemingly right around the corner. Egypt will be able to accommodate both of its conservatives and liberals in an economic progress-driven, bold and independent government. The archetype, of which the future of Egypt is likened to by the optimists, is Turkey.


Yet, neither Turkey nor Iran is where Egypt's today and tomorrow lies. The dynamics of the 1979 revolution in Iran and the socio-political and religious structures of the country differ dramatically from Egypt. With no uniting figure like Khomeini, who can appeal to a broad range of people and who can offer a new coherent and radical vision to 'save' the country, the Egyptian unrest does not have a specific path to follow. Unlike the strong hierarchical nature of Shi-ite faith, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood is divided within itself and has no clear or coherent vision for the country, save for discourses on morality and religiosity accompanied by some rhetoric of democracy.

While the influence and actual capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood is often exaggerated, due to our own fears of Islamism and terror, the complexity and polyphony of the Egyptian social and political landscape are often overlooked. The vast majority of Egyptians do not want a backwards-looking Islamist country, but as Muslims, they want a government that is just and fair and upholds moral codes of Islam.

This is where the image of Turkey as a role model for Egypt seems to make sense. After all, the ruling AKP government in Turkey is just what Egyptians seem to want: a conservative Muslim government with a pragmatic appetite for financial gain and diplomatic independence. However, the factors which enabled AKP to formulate and achieve a new political horizon - such as the long historical process that has modified Islam and Islamists in Turkey, multiple political parties and free elections and strong external pressure for reform due to EU accession talks - are not readily available to Egypt.

Egyptian politics might eventually look like Turkey one day, but in order for that to happen, the country must be willing to endure a chaotic and often paralyzing political stage. Ironically, that first stage will look a lot like Israel.

The only current political narrative that can unite Egypt is nationalism, embodied by the Armed Forces and their positive stand amongst all segments of the Egyptian society. Thus, just like Israel, we have seen and will see more military figures seizing the moment and pursuing political careers.

The social tensions between the Islamist, mildly Islamist, culturally conservative, socialist and liberal segments of the Egyptian society will continually be a point of contention, just like in Israel. And just like Israel, Egypt will find a working, but imperfect balance in accommodating religious and secular populations.

Increasing political freedoms in Egypt will result in formation of political parties that will reflect all of the colours of Egypt from its 12million-strong Coptic Christians to its Islamists and liberals, all competing to represent their agendas and visions. Thus, with no party having clear majority, subsequent Egyptian governments will be weak coalitions trying to bring together completely opposing political visions, just like Israeli politics.

But for now, the immediate outcome of this month's social unrest will not be a "revolution" - a word which is now empty of meaning thanks to its frequent metaphorical use - but an "evolution". And for all we know from our biological evolution, it will be a rather messy process before such an evolution reaches its excellence.

New Essay; Laicite, Religion and Socio-Political Dissociative Personality Disorder in Turkey







The Foreign Policy Centre; "Exploring Turkishness: Rights, Identity and the EU Essay Series", December 2010


Ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the young Turkish Republic has struggled to formulate and actualize a coherent socio-political narrative. While the military successes of the founders have clearly marked the borders and independence of the Republic, their political visions and the tensions it created remains to be unresolved.

First of these is the vision of a homogenized nation state, formed by a mono-race with one language and one religion and expressed with the archetypal identity of a ‘Turk’. While formulation of such a macro nation making vision only took a handful of intellectuals educated in Europe, its actualization has been a painful and ultimately unsuccessful process. After more than 80 years of forced assimilation, ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, still continue to refuse being consumed into being branded a ‘Turk’ and use their own languages as their native tongues. Kurdish demands for cultural, if not political, autonomy are as strong as the first days of the Republic.

The second of the political visions is the place of religion in the new nation project. In order to develop a unifying identity of ‘Turkishness’, the founders of the Republic used Islam as a marker separating the Turks from the others. Islam was the only available common denominator for bringing together large sways of ethnic groups including Kurds, Turks, Alevis and Circassians. The non-Muslims, who were always seen as inferior and unequal to ruling Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, were to be the eternal internal enemies, who work with foreign powers and want land and autonomy. They had three options; assimilate, or leave or accept a non-visible existence.

However, while Islam could serve as a separation from the ‘other’, it was also a threat. The founders saw Islam and the clerics to be guilty of stopping reforms and hindering the Empire from adopting into the modern era. The demolition of the caliphate system by the Republic and closing down of independent Islamic centres were part of the attempts to break the hold of religion. Just like in the minds of 19th century ‘learned’ European thinkers, for the founders, religion had to be a matter of personal faith and ultimately done away with the progress of modernization- a wish that never came true.

That is why the official interpretation of secularism in Turkey meant that while religious establishment should be hindered from power over the political establishment, the state should regulate religion. Through the creation of a Directorate of Religious Affairs and employment of all of the imams as civil servants, the Turkish state has de facto established an enforced state religion, even though the Turkish constitution does not include any reference to a state religion and Article 2 of the constitution declares Turkey to be ‘secular’. In effect, the state has developed and forced one particular officially sanctioned version of Islam on its citizens. This meant that the Muslims who did not already fit into the official Islam also had no option but to assimilate.

Almost all of the political and social problems in today’s Turkey stem from these ill conceived and faulty political visions. Whether in armed conflict with the Kurdish militias or in continual tensions over the use of headscarves in public spaces or in ongoing persecution and exclusion of non-Muslim, we witness the end of know-how of political ideas developed in previous centuries. Religious Muslims demand to be free from state regulation and limitations. Ethnic minorities demand to be free to use their languages and express their cultures, and non-Muslims still demand to be free from persecution and to feel protected.

Yet, the state structures continue to see any identity but that of the archetypal ‘Turk ‘a threat to nation’s existence and to see its enforcement as a duty. This has made ‘Turkishness’ a tightly controlled club with ambiguous membership requirements and high demands for unquestioning allegiance to state. The elites of Ankara bureaucracy, Armed Forces and Istanbul businesses have seen themselves as the guardians and gate keepers of that club till now. This silent class division in Turkey- those who are the real Ataturk following Turks and who rule the land versus the peasants who need to be controlled and tamed, is currently facing a major derailing in the forms of landslide electoral successes of AKP.

Unlike the traditional political elite of Turkey, AKP has symbolized the reality of majority of Turkey; culturally conservative yet economically liberal and pragmatic. The record breaking ratio of votes given to AKP has expressed the disillusionment of the country with the old guard, which has proved itself to be impotent and self serving. While many people gave AKP the benefit of the doubt in 2002 and took their promise of reforms and liberalization at its face value, after eight years of AKP rule, AKP’s votes still remain high.

Without a doubt, the first reason for this is AKP’s economic performance, which has not only protected the country from the global recession but also dropped inflation and attracted never-seen before levels of direct foreign investment to the country. Today’s economic forecasts of the future of Turkish economy signals a steady increase in Turkey’s ranking among G20 countries and future place among BRIC countries. This is a far cry from the collapse of Turkish economy under the Ecevit government in 2000.

Yet, one cannot ignore the core fact that AKP has done what no other party has been able to do so thus far and appealed to broader segments of the country from central Anatolian Turks to liberals of Istanbul, Kurds and even to non-Muslims. AKP’s remarkable commitment to EU membership and improvement of human rights in Turkey resulted in land mark developments in freedom for minorities. Through reforms such as lifting the ban on languages other than Turkish, addressing registration and property problems of non-Muslim groups, allowing change of religion section in national ID cards and granting non-Muslim children exemption from compulsory Islamic religious education in schools, AKP has indeed showed promising democratic attitudes. Recent loosening of the headscarf ban in universities is slowly ending a disgraceful era of discrimination that denied the right to education to hundreds of thousands Muslim girls.

While, these developments signal positive changes in the state structures, sadly, one major black hole still remains, even with the cosmetic touches of reform. As Turkish state and society seem to be maturing into handling Islam, democracy and laicite1 in balance, this cannot be said so for the attitudes towards non-Muslims. Last ten years have seen substantial deterioration in attitudes against non-Muslims and a fresh come back of violent mob attacks on non-Muslim individuals and religious centers.

As the turbulent political atmosphere in the country continually portrayed the country to be at the brink of destruction from within by groups seeking to derail Ataturk’s legacy, non-Muslims once again emerged as the eternal other, who should not be in Turkey. If, one can name it a ‘success’, those who have desired a country with no non-Muslims are close to achieve their dream. Today, the total number of non-Muslims in the country is not more than 120,000, a scandalous decline from millions 50 years ago.

The never ending desire to find internal enemies and foreign powers under every rock signals a deep anxiety and a picture of country that is ultimately at conflict with itself. On one hand, it enforces Islam as the marker of who a Turk is, yet at the same time it does not allow Islam to be lived with its most logical expressions. On one hand, the country markets itself as a place where East meets West and where civilizations have born, yet at the same time it sees any form of religious and cultural difference a threat to its existence. On one hand, the country longs to be seen as a modern and future oriented country and shuns its Middle Eastern neighbors as backward nations. On the other hand, its perceptions of human rights, handling of minorities and low level of public accountability and debate, it reflects a previous century.

This does raise serious questions about the future of Turkey, even with the promising and often limited reforms of the AKP government. It is still far from clear whether yesterday’s excluded religiously conservative Muslims of Turkey will not turn into tomorrow’s exclusive guardians of new Turkey. Given the immense polarization of the Turkish society along conservative and secularist lines, and high levels of anti non-Muslim feelings and dead ends of the Kurdish issues, we have every reason to fear that future can get better or worse.

Simply put, while the visions of the founding father of Turkish Republic carried the country thus far, unless they are updated to accommodate the world as it is now and give Turkey a new unifying vision, they will continue to stifle the country’s future and cause serious human rights abuses. It is high time for Turkey to focus on equal citizenship rather than race based national allegiance. Only such a convivial Turkey that cherishes and protects its ethnic and religious diversity as equal pieces of its identity can flourish in the globalised world, thus fulfill the ultimate vision of Ataturk to make Turkey a leading modern country.

Turkey’s EU bid no longer ‘non-negotiable’

Interview by Xi Chen, Hurriyet Daily News, 3 October 2010

Turkey is in search of an era of new politics in international relations and might even withdraw its European Union bid in the next three to five years if membership remains ungranted, a London-based Turkish researcher has said.

In a report named “The Prospects for Turkey” published last month by the Legatum Institute, Ziya Meral outlines the changes that Turkey has been going through since the late 1990s both in domestic and foreign politics. He describes these changes as a “metamorphosis” for the nation.

The report concludes that this turbulent process of change is key to further development of democracy in Turkey and to “Turkish adaptation to the realities of the 21st century.”

In domestic politics, Meral argues that there are two sets of problems facing Turkey: “actual problems,” such as the Kurdish issue, and ”engineered problems,” such as the ideological battle between political parties that polarize the society along the lines of secular versus religious.

According to Meral, the rise of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, eight years ago was precisely because the party could represent the “common reality” of Turkey, enforcing pro-market, pro-EU policies while remaining socially conservative.

“The AKP has unleashed the changes but it has not achieved its objectives,” Meral told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review. He said he believes an era of new politics is needed in Turkey as “politicians need to be creative and re-imagine themselves under the new reality rather than falling back into the old discourse.”

Moving toward independence

In a maturing democracy, “votes could no longer be taken for granted in a society that showed an increasing pattern of non-ideological and rational voting for parties which can offer solutions,” the report said.

In the global arena, Meral foresees Turkey being a more “independent actor.” He argues that the government, after the 2011 general elections, will likely “switch” its EU policy, as “Turks increasingly feel humiliated by the prolonged process.”

“The EU is a political vision and Turkey will be a key in it. However, the same EU has grown into a giant bureaucratic machine with a lot of problems. In the end, what does the EU have to offer to Turkey?” Meral asked. He said he believes EU membership is no longer “non-negotiable” in the Turkish policy agenda.

The Legatum report concludes that “a proactive Turkey with a pragmatic foreign policy seeking to expand its economic and diplomatic ties in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia has so much to offer not only to an unstable region but also for the U.S. and EU.”

New Essay; Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity






The Washington Quarterly- October 2010, Volume 33, Number 4
Ziya Meral & Jonathan Paris

Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) initially assumed power in 2002, soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks, international media has devoted more attention to developments in Turkey. For domestic observers, the conservative Muslim AKP’s emergence and subsequent landslide victory in 2007 evoked fears about eroding secularism in the country. For foreign observers, as the threat of militant Islamism became the lens through which to view events in the Muslim world, the AKP’s electoral victories stoked worries about theWest ‘‘losing’’ Turkey. Although the AKP’s record-breaking eight years in office have cooled much of the hysteria about Turkey’s domestic orientation, recent Turkish foreign policy activity has unleashed a brand new wave of handwringing about Ankara.

Much of the commentary on the country, however, is littered with a lack of understanding of Turkey’s domestic context or of the surrounding environment from Ankara’s perspective. Many pundits ask the wrong questions, which lead to the wrong conclusions. The main question is not whether Turkey is giving up ties with the United States and the EU in exchange for closer ties with questionable countries, like Iran and Syria, and non-state actors in the Islamic world. Instead, for a variety of historical and contemporary geopolitical reasons, Turkey has pursued a more proactive engagement policy since the early 2000s in both regional and global affairs, seeking greater influence in the Middle East and consequently gaining a respected place at the high table of leading countries in the world. The key question is: has this fresh Turkish zeal led Ankara to miscalculate its influence, punch above its weight, and risk greater losses to Turkey’s potential stabilizing role and its interests?

Download the full essay here.

Public Talks in September-December 2010

September 20: I will be presenting a summary of current challenges Turkey is facing, along with a presention by Robert O'Daly from the Economist Intelligence Unit to mark the release of my new report Prospects for Turkey at the Legatum Institute, London.

November 20: I will be presenting a paper on minority politics in Muslim-majority states at "State Reactions to New Religions Seminar" at the London School of Economics.

New Report: Prospects for Turkey

On September 20, Legatum Institute will release a new report I have written on the susbtantial socio-political changes in Turkey and Turkish foreign policy.

The key findings of this report include:

• More than any other political party in Turkey, the AKP represents the reality of Turkey - a country that wants to be an independent global actor with a flourishing democracy and economy, while also striving to maintain its values and culture.

• Eight years of AKP rule have not Islamised Turkey. The AKP has turned out to be one of the most pro-EU, pro-market economy, pro-human rights, and pro-democracy governments Turkey has ever had.

• The AKP’s strong performance on economic and political issues has been tainted by intense clashes within the state structures and with opposition parties, and limited by the party’s own failures in fulfilling its promises and handling opposition.

• Far from an inevitable point of contention, a proactive Turkey with a pragmatic foreign policy seeking to expand its economic and diplomatic ties in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia has so much to offer not only to an unstable region but also for the US and EU.

• The outcome of the national elections in the summer of 2011, a possible large-scale Kurdish intifada, and potential fallout with key Western and Middle eastern countries due to Turkish engagement with previously shunned states, are key challenges awaiting it.

• Turkey needs close support from the US and the EU to enable a stable maturation, just as the US and the EU need to keep Turkey as a close ally for their own economic and political interests.

A print copy of the report can be obtained from Legatum Institute and a PDF version can be downloaded here .