Turkey and Israel: souring international relations

Published by Channel 4 News Website, 03 June


Ever since Prime Minister Erdogan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in January 2009 following remarks by Israeli President Shimon Peres, it was clear that Turkish and Israeli relations were entering a turbulent phase.

The rift continued to deepen when Israel refused to allow Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu to visit the Gaza strip on an official visit to Israel in September 2009.

In retaliation, Turkey cancelled Israel's participation at a joint international air exercise in October 2009. In January 2010, the diplomatic tensions rocketed when the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon summoned the Turkish ambassador to protest against an anti-Semitic episode of a popular Turkish television drama.

In a bizarre populist show of superiority, Ayalon sought to insult the Turkish ambassador by placing him on a lower chair and by urging the media to report the lower seating of the ambassador.

Verbal duels between the Netanyahu and Erdogan administrations gave way to subtle signals through cutbacks on defence trade between the two countries, something that has been a major aspect of Turkish Israeli relations.

Since 1990s, Turkey and Israel had enjoyed quiet cooperation on joint military exercises, modernisation of military equipment, intelligence sharing and arms trade in addition to investments in civilian enterprises.

Until last Sunday, there were still strong reasons to believe that Israel and Turkey will continue to enjoy these quiet exchanges but with caution and some downsizing. Things look pretty different now.

Last Sunday's events could have been prevented and Israel could have been saved from a major international public condemnation if it had not chosen to stop the vessels carrying aid to Gaza with a theatrical military operation.

Although the details of exactly what happened is far from clear, the end result is the death of at least nine activists and equal numbers of wounded Israeli soldiers. Israel is still seeking to win a moral and political higher ground by arguing that the flotilla posed a security threat to Israel, if not the entire region, by "supporting" Hamas and other terrorists.

The response of the Turkish government has been extremely strong, yet calculated and carefully ambiguous thus far. Public threats of a major overhaul of Turkish Israeli relations have only been followed by immense efforts at the UN, EU and US levels to force Israel to accept culpability.

However, with the Israeli government continuing to take a hard stance, the statements by various Turkish politicians that things will never be the same again will probably come true. Israel may have just lost its only Muslim ally, and one which is an increasingly ambitious and powerful force in the Middle East.

Public Talks in June and July 2010

June 14-18: I will be giving a lecture on minority rights with the title "Nation Making and Minority Politics; the case of Turkey" at the Minority Rights, Indigenous People and Human Rights Law Summer School, Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway- Ireland

July 25-30: I will be attending and giving a lecture on the socio-political context of religious conversion in Muslim-majority states at the Islam and Religious Freedom Seminar , Whiterspoon Institute, Princeton- USA

The Metamorphosis of Turkey





Published by Public Service, 29 March

My dictionary defines metamorphosis as "the process of transformation from an immature form to an adult form in two or more distinct stages." Clearly, the process spoken here is a biological one and using such a language to analyse a country is laden with problems. However, the word metamorphosis is the best metaphor I could find thus far to describe what Turkey is going through.

In some levels, it is clear that Turkey is still aspiring to be a EU member and most Turks see themselves as Europeans. Yet, at the same time Turkey has invited Sudan's notorious Omal al-Bashir to the country with red carpets, publicly backed Ahmedinejad's election 'victory' and engaged with all the shunned countries and groups like Hamas and Syria and alienated its traditional allies such as Israel with angry outbursts. Where is Turkey heading? To the East or the West? Is the traditional friend of the EU, NATO and US turning out to be a foe?

The domestic scene is equally confusing. Not a week passes before a new scandal breaks out. Top generals are being arrested and questioned for alleged attempts to take over the country. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Erdogan publicly ostracises critical media outlets and forces hefty tax punishments on unsupportive corporations. A brand new elite is ruling Turkey, but where is Turkey heading? Is it turning out to be an Islamist country on a fast-track course to instability and civil unrest?

All of these are genuine worries and questions, some more valid than others. It is true that Turkish foreign policy as well as domestic politics and structures are undergoing substantial changes, but a closer look reveals a more promising picture.
With the appointment of the foreign minister Davutoglu, the AKP government has faced the reality that the world has changed and if Turkey was to survive these turbulent days it had to adopt itself to a new era. Davutoglu has promoted a 'zero conflict' in all of Turkey's borders and a diversification and deepening of Turkish relations with other countries.

This was inevitable. Turkey has increasingly lost confidence in the EU project because different EU states and bodies continued to communicate mixed messages on the future of Turkey and EU talks. Meanwhile, Russian-Georgian conflict throughout 2008/2009 and Russian-EU tensions over energy convinced Turkey to leave aside its traditional foreign policy stagnation.

Thus, Turkey took unprecedented attempts to emerge as a negotiator in the Middle East, to solve never-ending problems with Armenia-Azerbaijan and Cyprus, and to become a neutral energy route for the lucrative petrol and gas resources in its neighbourhood. In other words, Turkey is becoming less 'ideological' in its relations but more 'rational' with a multi-faceted calculation of its own interests.

The pragmatic shift is also true for domestic political and social changes. The reason why AKP assumed a majority power in 2002 as a brand new party was that Turks were fed up with the traditional political elites of the country. AKP generated record-breaking votes ever since, even from non-Muslims and liberals, because it has been the most pro-EU, pro-reform, pro-human rights, pro-democracy and pro-foreign investment government Turkey has had in this generation. Yet, the results of the 2009 local elections and current estimates, which forecast AKP's votes to be around 33 per cent for the 2011 national elections, show that whenever AKP has stopped its democratic reforms and EU commitment and lapsed into autocratic attitudes, it has lost votes.

This reflects the reality of Turkey – a forward looking yet traditionally conservative society that wants to be in the EU, yet at the same time feels the need to diversify its relations and investments; a friendly ally who wants to be close to the West, yet at the same time wants to be an independent global actor on its own merits and terms and does not want to be bullied.

Such a Turkey is far from being a foe but of further value for the EU, US and NATO. In a chaotic region like the Middle East, a vibrant democracy with a liberal economy and pragmatic foreign policy is only good news. Turkish presence in Afghanistan and Iraq has played a quiet but significant stabilising role. In the years to come, a Turkey that speaks to all of her neighbours will be key for US and EU foreign policy, with Turkish support on actions towards Iran and co-operation on alternative energy routes with European countries sine qua non.

Although publicly Turkey was criticised for talking to Hamas, re-engaging with Syria and seeking to develop economic relations with Iran, it is now a common attitude that isolating Hamas does not work. The US is currently upgrading its diplomatic presence in Syria, and France is way more ahead than Turkey in having its slices of the Iranian market.

Yet, one must not be naïve. The maturation process of Turkish democracy is no guarantee that it will turn out to be constructive and that Turkish interests will align themselves with those of Europe and the US in each and every turn. Change is a precarious process. That is why Turkey needs close support from the EU more than ever, if the EU is still aspiring for stability in Europe and its neighbourhood and productive engagement with the rest of the world.

Kohelet, my play returns to stage in Istanbul


I am thrilled to announce that Kohelet starts its second season in Istanbul at the Caddebostan Kultur Merkezi from October 9 and onwards. Last theatre season, the play had attracted nation wide media attention and warm feedback from the audiences.

The play tells the story of a Turkish professor, Ahmet, and his wife, Sevgi. Ahmet is a US educated, well respected academic who lectures literature in Istanbul. He has a television show and a daily column at a newspaper, and is a best selling author. However, after a tragic loss, Ahmet questions the value of all that he has achieved and learned in life. While researching for his new book, he stumbles across Ecclesiastes (Kohelet in Hebrew) in the Bible and duly agrees; meaningless, everything is utterly meaningless!

Ahmet's wife too silently mourns the seeming loss of the couple's love for each other, as Sevgi is convinced that Ahmet is having an affair with a research student. A mundane visit to their house by Sevgi's new friend Sirin and her businessman husband Alp pushes the couple to a breaking point. When the news arrive that the research student has committed suicide, the past and the present, fears and jealousies and whatever was kept hidden comes out of their closets. Although it eventually becomes clear that the student has survived the suicide attempt and that it has nothing to do with Ahmet, the events of the night usher the couple to a journey of questioning and rediscovering the value of their love.

Whither Turkey?

Ziya Meral & Jonathan Paris, Hurriyet Daily News, 9 March

Recent arrests and the questioning of top military commanders over an alleged plot to create chaos in Turkey have many in the international media and elsewhere wondering if the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, which came to power in 2002, is spearheading an Islamist takeover.

Can these arrests be seen as the latest act of a once seemingly Western-friendly AKP government on a mission to fulfill its Islamist ambitions? Current tensions between Israel and Turkey and major new initiatives in Turkish foreign policy toward once-shunned states in the Middle East seem to point to the same concerns of a Turkey turning her face from West to East.

Although the genuine concerns of foreign observers and Western governments need to be addressed, predicting the future of Turkey from its changing foreign policy without an awareness of the domestic context results in problematic conclusions. A blinkered perspective explains why most foreign commentators have misread how and why the AKP came into power and how it maintained growing support from Turkish society, at least until 2009.


The AKP generated broad support not because it claimed roots in an Islamist movement but because its pro-EU, pro-foreign investment, pro-democracy and pro-reform policies have attracted votes not only from its natural base of conservatives, but also from liberals, leftist groups, marginalized ethnic groups such as Kurds and even non-Muslims. All attempts by the Kemalist elites of the Turkish state and the armed forces to undermine the AKP’s coveted position through orchestrated social campaigns and politicized judicial efforts have led to wider support for AKP at home and abroad as a victim of anti-democratic power structures.

However, the March 2009 local elections recorded only a 39 percent victory for the AKP, a significant drop from its 47 percent majority in the previous election in 2007. In retrospect, the AKP began losing its momentum in 2008 when it became perceived as a party that seeks to fill the pockets of its own supporters and punish anyone who stands in the way. In other words, the Turkish public was reacting to AKP in the same way it reacted to the other established parties that the AKP defeated in 2002.

Efforts to regain AKP’s image of reform after the 2009 elections initially resulted in a burst of renewed excitement, particularly over promises to address the Kurdish issue and the problems faced by the Alevis, a religious and ethnic minority group of some 10 million, as well as proposed democratic changes to the current military-friendly Constitution.

Yet, the AKP failed to implement any of these initiatives. Its silence over the closure of the Kurdish party, DTP, and subsequent arrests of Kurdish politicians lost it credibility as more and more voters realized that the AKP’s democratic vision lacked substance.

Meanwhile, on the economic front, unemployment soared to a record high while the AKP publicly maintained the patently unsupportable argument that the global economic crisis had bypassed Turkey because its banks were soundly managed and capitalized. It is no surprise that currently AKP’s support hovers around 34 percent, a record low for the party.

The rise and slippage of the AKP reveals much about the mood in Turkey that is often overlooked. Whenever the AKP achieved significant steps towards EU accession, economic growth, foreign investment, democracy and human rights, it gained broad popular support. When the AKP slowed down on reform and relapsed into power games and autocracy, it lost votes.

The AKP’s volatile popularity reflects where Turkish society is today: Europe-looking, yearning for more democracy and economic liberty and, at the same time, trying to maintain a conservative culture and strong national identity. The greatest portion of the society wants a meaningful engagement with the world, not a return to an isolationist Islamist state. A study done by Sabancı University in 2009 found that the ratio of Turks who want Shariah Law in Turkey went down to 10 percent from 26 percent ten years earlier in 1999.

The Kemalist elites have never been able to reflect the country’s reality outside of the golden triangle of Istanbul-Ankara-İzmir. By insisting on a peculiar type of secularism and national identity, they have alienated large sections of the Turkish society. That is why all of their attempts to treat Turkish society like a herd that will hand power back to them have not worked.

Today, for the first time since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, a military coup looks impossible. The armed forces and the old elites now know that they are not any longer a law unto themselves. Turkish society has discovered its voice and has become the primary engine behind reform and progress.

If this reading of the deeper social and political tensions in Turkey is correct, then recent changes in Turkish foreign policy cannot be seen simply in terms of a religious re-orientation of the country or an aggressive Islamist policy. Turkey must be understood on its own terms as a country which is evolving towards a stronger democracy that wants to be a proactive and independent actor in the world.

Where this will take Turkey and what this will mean for United States-European Union-Turkey relations and stability in the Caucasus and the Middle East are open questions. That is why Turkey needs close support from the U.S. and EU more than ever before to ensure a soft landing.

Public talks in February 2010

February 13: I will be presenting a paper with the title "Are cows happier than Middle Easterners? Socio-political context of victimhood memories in the Middle East and their implications" at the "Understanding New Wars" conference organised by the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Cambridge.

February 9: By kind invitation of Bob Laxton MP, the Henry Jackson Society , and the All-Party British-Turkish Parliamentary Group, I will be speaking on current political tensions in Turkey and possible future scenarios at the House of Commons, Committee Room 16, 1-2 Pm.

February 5: The Journal of Law and Public will host “The Armenian Genocide Within the Framework of National and International Law” from 9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. in the Schulze Grand Atrium at the School of Law, University of St Thomas, Mineapolis, USA. I will be a discussant and commentator, alongside presentations from William A. Schabas, National University of Ireland; Geoffrey Robertson, QC, Doughty Street Chambers; Roger W. Smith, International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies; Mark L. Movsesian, St. John's University School of Law and Vahakn N. Dadrian, Zoryan Institute.

FREE IRAN, For IRANIAN PEOPLE!

Statement for Legatum Institute to mark the 31st anniversary of the Iranian Revolution

For most outsiders, the name of Iran evokes images of nuclear weapons, Holocaust denying surreal dictators with beards. For us, who have had the privilege of being in Iran, knowing Iranians and witnessing their suffering first hand, the images in our minds are of an amazing people with an amazing heritage and culture. When we cry for a Free Iran, that is what we are screaming for! What we dream is an Iran that is a true reflection of her own people! An Iran that is no more associated with disappearances, extra-judicial killings, incommunicado detentions, and arbitrary use of power! This we want, not for our selves, but for Iranians, who are muted, caged and overpowered by an oppressive regime! We cannot stay indifferent and distant to the calls for help from millions of people in Iran! What is at stake here is not simply challenges to foreign policies or diplomatic games for national interests! What we face is a humanitarian crisis with a human face and cost! Join us, scream as loud as you can, cry, pray, protest for a Free Iran! Nor for us, but for Iranians!

Beauty, depending on where you live

Published in Hurriyet Daily News, 27 November

I still find it very sad that the first Filipino words I learned were “malaking ilong.” I kept hearing those words repeatedly as I walked around Manila’s giant shopping malls in my very first days of living in the country. When I asked what they meant, a friend told me the sad truth in full agony and embarrassment: big nose.

I have never been under the illusion that I had the world’s most conservative and miniscule nose, but until that point in my life it was never a public exclamation or excitement. What caused me to emerge in a real-life Cyrano de Bergerac role was the fact that Filipinos, no offence, do not tend to have proper noses – proper as defined in this part of the world.

The positive side of it was that I could have made it to a basketball team in the country, as my height, which was normal for us, was rather exceptional there. In fact, twice, random pregnant women pinched my back site on the streets, due to the belief that if they did so their children would also be tall like me. I always laughed thinking, “They did not see the malaking ilong as they approached me from my back, that would be my revenge!”


These funny exchanges signal a much more complex issue of how our perceptions of beauty are shaped by our cultural and geographical location, if not orientation.

I always found it amusing to see the excessive money spent and great lengths gone by some Asian women to lighten the color of their skin, and at the same time to see my British friends go great lengths with fake tanning and torturously long sun bathing to darken their skin color, just a bit for a day or two.

Similarly, I get puzzled by seeing increasing obsession in the West with size zero, if not the closest to that “ideal,” and at the same time listening to the comments of my African and Polynesian male friends on how thin Western women won’t make it as suitable brides in their countries, and how my Middle Eastern and Latino friends love their curves.

What can be seen as most mundane in one country, e.g. blond hair in Scandinavia, can be seen as an extremely attractive feature somewhere else, e.g. a blond Scandinavian woman in Turkey.

Obviously, these are tongue-in-cheek over-generalizations. Yet, they draw our attention to something much deeper than what meets the eye. It seems, that just like we travel between different time zones, there are invisible lines that separate different perceptions of beauty and attractiveness across the world.

This challenges the conventional wisdom that beauty is a subjective judgment of the individual and that it is in the eye of the individual beholder. Somehow, collectives produce and then internalize descriptions of a “desirable woman.” Thus, the beholder is looking at its object through the limited angle and lenses provided by his or her culture, not simply out of personal taste. So, we learn “beauty,” just as we learn what is a “good life.”

The realization that beauty, and thus personal conformity pressures we face, has strong social conditioning can be liberating. The first thing that comes to my mind is the fun strategy of moving to another “beauty zone” if the one you are in is stressing you, just like people move to warmer climates.

If you feel your nose is too big and people laugh at you in East Asia, move to Central Asia and the Middle East. If you feel your looks are just plain and common, move to the far end of the world, where your hair color or skin complexion is rare. If you feel a bit too conscious about the extra pounds you have put on as the years go by and if the Western culture is causing you to have nightmares, pack your bags to Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. You won’t regret it.

The second thing is of course an assuring realization that most people are lead to feel horrible about themselves by the aggressive assertions of their cultures. It is indeed heartbreaking to see eating disorders haunting 14-year-old girls who think that they are “too fat,” and it is similarly heartbreaking to see an olive-skinned Asian trying to look “white” as a statement of social status.

This does not need to be! All across centuries and across different cultures we have been shaped to confirm into shapes and behaviors that were presented to us as what it means to be beautiful and worthy. Yet, long gone are the days since Chinese women had to wear iron shoes to keep their feet small, or British women had to cover their faces with that ghostly white powder.

Being exposed to another culture and its perception of beauty helps us to see the bizarreness of what we are exposed to as the “plain truth” in our own home culture; hopefully, leading to a much more mature and confident self-actualization, if not the first flight to a different beauty zone.